docs: audit and archive completed Journals and Badges projects
This commit is contained in:
Scott Idem
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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# Aether — Permissions and Security
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**Last Updated:** 2026-02-27
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**Last Updated:** 2026-06-12
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**Source of truth:** `src/lib/ae_utils/ae_utils__perm_checks.ts`, `src/lib/stores/ae_stores.ts`
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---
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@@ -76,15 +76,18 @@ $ae_loc.adv_mode // boolean — advanced mode toggle
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| AE Username + Password | `trusted` and above | Staff with AE accounts |
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| Novi UUID | `authenticated` | IDAA members (Novi membership system) |
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Passcodes are stored per-level in `$ae_loc.site_access_code_kv`:
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```typescript
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site_access_code_kv: {
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administrator: null, // highest passcode tier
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trusted: null, // onsite staff passcode
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public: 'public1980', // example
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authenticated: 'auth1980'
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}
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```
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### Site Passcode Security Warning
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The current frontend receives every site passcode in `access_code_kv_json`, copies the map into
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persisted `$ae_loc.site_access_code_kv`, and compares entered passcodes locally. Verbose logging
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can also expose the complete map. This is a known active security gap, not the target design.
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Do not add new consumers of `site_access_code_kv`, log passcodes, or treat persisted
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`access_type` as durable proof of authentication. The target flow verifies passcodes through
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`/authenticate_passcode`, stores a signed JWT with a role-specific TTL, and removes passcodes from
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the public bootstrap response and client state.
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See `documentation/PROJECT__AE_Site_Passcode_Security.md` for the active migration plan.
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### `x-no-account-id` — Narrow Transport Exception
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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
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**Module Path:** `src/routes/events/[event_id]/(badges)/templates/`
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**API Module:** `src/lib/ae_events/ae_events__event_badge_template.ts`
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**Database Table:** `event_badge_template`
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**Last Updated:** 2026-03-02
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**Last Updated:** 2026-06-12
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---
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@@ -310,6 +310,10 @@ Controls which fields appear in the print controls panel for non-trusted users,
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Valid field keys: `name`, `title`, `affiliations`, `location`, `pronouns`, `allow_tracking`.
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This config applies to the onsite print controls. Remote review currently uses
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`event.mod_badges_json.edit_permissions` instead. Consolidating or defining precedence between
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these two permission sources is tracked in `documentation/TODO__Agents.md`.
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---
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## Template-Derived Features (component behavior)
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@@ -342,7 +346,8 @@ in DB and may be needed:
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- `footer_title`, `footer_left`, `footer_right` — not needed (legacy)
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- `header_background`, `footer_background` — not needed (legacy)
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- `script_src` — do not add; this field should not be used
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- `duplex` — **add when backend adds the field**
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`duplex` is already saved to IDB and drives single-sided rendering.
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---
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@@ -58,13 +58,25 @@ Aether acts as a **Pull-Only** consumer for registration data. It does not push
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| Level | Access |
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|---|---|
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| **Authenticated** | View own badge, limited self-edit (overrides only). |
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| **Trusted** | Search all badges, view all, reprint existing badges. |
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| **Administrator** | Full CRUD, bulk operations, override any field. |
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| **Manager** | All Admin + Event/Template configuration. |
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| **Public kiosk** | View badge and perform the first print; cannot edit fields without authenticated access. |
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| **Authenticated** | Edit fields allowed by the active permission config. |
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| **Trusted** | Search all badges, view all, and correct names; reprint requires global Edit Mode. |
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| **Administrator** | Full CRUD, bulk operations, and override access. |
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| **Manager** | All Administrator capabilities plus Event/Template configuration. |
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### Attendee Self-Service (`/review`)
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Attendees can access their own record via a passcode-gated link (typically `?passcode=...`). This allows them to verify their info and provide preferred name/title overrides before printing.
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Attendees can access their own record via a passcode-gated link (typically `?passcode=...`).
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Editable fields come from `event.mod_badges_json.edit_permissions`, with module defaults as fallback.
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### Onsite Kiosk (`/print`)
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The print controls update the badge preview live. Authenticated field editing is controlled by the
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badge template's `cfg_json.controls_cfg` (`shown` and `auth_editable`). Trusted + global Edit Mode
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overrides the template config and exposes all controls. This differs from the review page's
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event-level permission source; consolidation is an active follow-up.
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### Review-Link Email
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Email Link actions are placeholders and do not currently send mail. When delivery is implemented,
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it must use the imported `event_badge.email` address, never attendee-editable `email_override`.
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---
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@@ -101,7 +113,13 @@ The badge type dropdown in the search form uses a **hardcoded list**, not the te
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---
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## Print Tracking
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## Print Rendering and Tracking
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- The canonical badge render uses binary-search text fitting for name, title, affiliations, and location.
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- Template `show_qr_front`/`show_qr_back` settings control QR placement.
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- Template `style_href` loads event-specific CSS on the print page.
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- Template `duplex = false` suppresses the badge back for single-sided stock.
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- Chromium PDF proofing requires margins set to None; physical printer paper size remains driver-controlled.
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Aether tracks the lifecycle of every physical badge to prevent unauthorized reprints and monitor kiosk activity.
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@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ This module manages private personal journals and journal entries with offline-f
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- Journal and journal-entry CRUD via V3 API wrappers.
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- Dexie-backed local cache with liveQuery-driven UI updates.
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- Private/passcode-aware access behavior.
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- Entry editing flows including auto-save configuration.
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- Private/passcode-aware access behavior and client-side content encryption.
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- Quick Add, Append/Prepend, import/export, and entry auto-save workflows.
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- Tabbed module, journal, and entry configuration modals.
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---
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@@ -38,15 +39,43 @@ Related config map:
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---
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## Implemented Entry Workflows
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- Quick Add creates a plaintext note in a selected journal without opening the full editor.
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- Append/Prepend injects timestamped content into an existing entry.
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- Bulk import creates entries from parsed files; export supports centralized templates.
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- Entry edits support debounced auto-save when `journals_loc.entry.auto_save` is enabled.
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- Full entry saves encrypt `content` into `content_encrypted` when the entry's `private`
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flag is enabled; disabling `private` clears encrypted content/history fields.
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- The non-reactive `decrypt_journal_entry()` helper isolates decryption from Svelte effects.
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- Entry configuration exposes Actions, Metadata, Security, and JSON views. Trusted users
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can Remove (disable); managers and administrators can hard Delete.
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## Current Security Limitations
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- `passcode_hash` is editable but is not compared as secondary authentication before
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decryption. This remains an active task.
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- Quick Add explicitly creates entries with `private: false`; import creates plaintext
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content without setting encryption fields. These paths do not currently offer E2EE.
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- Successful decryption currently logs a short plaintext preview to the browser console.
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Removal is tracked as an active privacy fix.
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- Outbound email sharing is not implemented and requires a product/security decision
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because journal content is private.
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---
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## Access and Privacy
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Journals contain private personal data. Treat all journal and journal-entry routes as authenticated/private content.
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Journals contain private personal data. The Journals layout renders module content only when
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the user has `user_id`, `person_id`, and `trusted_access`. Treat all journal and journal-entry
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routes, API responses, decrypted state, logs, exports, and future sharing features as private.
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---
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## Related Docs
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- `documentation/PROJECT__AE_UI_Journals_Module_Update_2026.md`
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- `documentation/archive/PROJECT__AE_UI_Journals_Module_Update_2026.md`
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- `documentation/TODO__Agents.md`
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- `documentation/GUIDE__SvelteKit2_Svelte5_DexieJS.md`
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- `documentation/GUIDE__AE_API_V3_for_Frontend.md`
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- `documentation/BOOTSTRAP__AI_Agent_Quickstart.md`
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@@ -53,9 +53,23 @@ This document tracks all available settings across the three levels of the Journ
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| `sort` | integer | Manual sort order weight. | Manual (Done) |
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| `archive_on` | datetime | Scheduled date for automatic archiving. | Manual (Done) |
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| `private` | boolean | Trigger for E2EE (Encryption). | Manual (Done) |
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| `content_encrypted` | encrypted string | Encrypted entry content written during a full save when `private` is enabled. | Generated on save |
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| `history_encrypted` | encrypted string | Encrypted entry history when history encryption is available. | Generated on save |
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| `passcode_hash` | string | Entry-level secondary-auth field; comparison logic is not yet implemented. | Manual (Done) |
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| `alert` | boolean | Trigger for visual "Alert" state. | Manual (Done) |
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| `group` | string | Grouping key for the list view. | Manual (JSON only) |
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## Encryption Behavior and Gaps
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1. Full entry saves combine the journal `passcode` and `private_passcode` to encrypt
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plaintext content when the entry's `private` flag is enabled.
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2. Decryption prefers a passcode typed in the current session, then falls back to the
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journal `private_passcode`; the journal `passcode` is combined with that private key.
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3. `passcode_hash` secondary-auth comparison is pending and must not be described as enforced.
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4. Quick Add currently forces `private: false`, and bulk import creates plaintext entries
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without encryption fields. Use the full editor to enable encryption until those workflows
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are updated.
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## 📐 Data Normalization Rules
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To prevent infinite reactivity loops and trivial save cycles, the following normalizations are applied before comparison:
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1. **Strings:** Trimmed and `null` treated as `""`.
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@@ -1,8 +1,14 @@
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# PROJECT: Site Passcode Security — API-Verified Auth
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**Last Updated:** 2026-04-10
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**Status:** Backend work in progress — frontend pending backend completion
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**Priority:** High — passcodes for trusted/administrator access currently in localStorage plaintext
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**Last Updated:** 2026-06-12
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**Last Verified Against Frontend Source:** 2026-06-12
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**Status:** Active security gap — frontend migration not started
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**Priority:** High — passcodes for trusted/administrator access currently remain in localStorage plaintext
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The frontend still caches `access_code_kv_json`, compares passcodes locally, and can log the
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full passcode map when verbose logging is enabled. No frontend call to `/authenticate_passcode`
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or passcode-JWT expiry restoration exists. Backend implementation is documented as completed,
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but deployment must be confirmed in the backend repository/environment before frontend cutover.
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---
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@@ -81,7 +87,11 @@ This gives session expiry without a network call on every page load.
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## Backend Changes Required
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**Note:** The backend fixes described below have been implemented and tested in the `aether_api_fastapi` repository (the `/authenticate_passcode` endpoint now uses explicit role priority, returns a full passcode JWT with `auth_type: 'passcode'`, applies per-role TTLs, and validates passcode length). Frontend changes can proceed once the backend deployment with these fixes is available.
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**Backend status note:** The fixes below were reported implemented and tested in the
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`aether_api_fastapi` repository. This frontend-only audit did not verify the backend source or
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deployment. Confirm that the deployed `/authenticate_passcode` uses explicit role priority,
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returns a complete passcode JWT with `auth_type: 'passcode'`, applies per-role TTLs, and validates
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passcode length before starting frontend cutover.
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### Backend Agent Follow-Up
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@@ -316,6 +326,19 @@ async def authenticate_passcode(
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---
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## Frontend Implementation Status
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Verified 2026-06-12:
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- [ ] Confirm the corrected backend endpoint is deployed and reachable.
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- [ ] Replace local passcode comparison with API verification and JWT storage.
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- [ ] Add pending/error UI for passcode authentication.
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- [ ] Stop copying `access_code_kv_json` into frontend auth state.
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- [ ] Validate passcode JWT expiry during session restoration.
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- [ ] Remove `site_access_code_kv` from auth store defaults and types.
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- [ ] Remove any logging of passcode maps or entered passcodes.
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- [ ] Backend Phase 2: remove `access_code_kv_json` from the public bootstrap model.
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## Frontend Changes Required
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**These depend on the backend fixes above being deployed first.**
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@@ -49,6 +49,14 @@ Do not delete historical context; move to `documentation/archive/` with clear na
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- Added `documentation/archive/README.md` to explain archive categories and restoration policy.
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- Renamed `AE__Docker_CI_Cache_Policy.md` -> `GUIDE__Docker_CI_Cache_Policy.md`.
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- Renamed `AE__UI_UX_future_ideas.md` -> `PROPOSAL__AE_UI_UX_Future_Ideas.md`.
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- Audited the Journals UI update against current source and archived
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`PROJECT__AE_UI_Journals_Module_Update_2026.md`; remaining security work was moved to
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the active task list and module documentation.
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- Audited the Badges review/print project against current source and archived
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`PROJECT__AE_Events_Badges_Review_Print.md`; email delivery and permission-source
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unification remain active follow-ups.
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- Audited Site Passcode Security against current source. It remains an active high-priority
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project because plaintext client storage and local passcode comparison are still present.
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### Next archive candidates (review + approve)
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- Older style-review snapshots once current style guide references are centralized.
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@@ -65,7 +73,7 @@ Monthly lightweight review:
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## 5) Immediate Follow-Up Tasks
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1. Run a quarterly archive review: identify stale `PROJECT__` docs with no TODO or index linkage and move them to `documentation/archive/`.
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2. Review `AE__Permissions_and_Security.md` against current permission helpers and IDAA authentication behavior.
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1. Continue quarterly archive reviews for remaining stale `PROJECT__` docs; the Journals and Badges projects were archived on 2026-06-12, while Site Passcode Security remains active.
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2. Continue the broader permission-helper and IDAA authentication review; the Site Passcode section was source-verified on 2026-06-12.
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3. Review module docs against current routes and store names rather than relying only on filename/header freshness.
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4. Add a lightweight reusable link-check script if manual path validation becomes frequent.
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@@ -55,8 +55,6 @@ Use this file as the routing map for project documentation.
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- `documentation/PROJECT__IDAA_Stores_Svelte5_Migration_2026.md`
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- `documentation/PROJECT__Use_AE_API_V3_CRUD_upgrade.md`
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- `documentation/PROJECT__AE_Events_PressMgmt_Config_Cleanup.md`
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- `documentation/PROJECT__AE_Events_Badges_Review_Print.md`
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- `documentation/PROJECT__AE_UI_Journals_Module_Update_2026.md`
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- `documentation/PROJECT__AE_Object_Field_Editor_V3_upgrade.md`
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- `documentation/PROJECT__AE_Site_Passcode_Security.md`
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@@ -72,6 +72,16 @@ wrong to users.
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- [x] **[Badges] Epson C3500 fanfold badge layout** — `badge_4x6_fanfold` layout CSS created,
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wired, and documented. First live use: Axonius Adapt DC, June 9, 2026. (2026-05-15)
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### Badges follow-ups
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- [ ] **[Badges] Implement review-link email delivery** — current Email Link actions only show
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placeholder alerts. Send to `event_badge.email`, never the attendee-editable `email_override`.
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- [ ] **[Badges] Unify review and kiosk edit permissions** — remote review reads
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`event.mod_badges_json.edit_permissions`; print controls read template `cfg_json.controls_cfg`.
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Define precedence or consolidate them so both flows enforce one documented policy.
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- [ ] **[Badges] Use template badge types in search filter** — replace the hardcoded badge-type
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list in `ae_comp__badge_search.svelte` with the active template's `badge_type_list`.
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---
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## 🚧 V3 CRUD Migration (Surgical Cleanup)
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@@ -85,6 +95,19 @@ Finalizing the 100% adoption of V3 Standard endpoints and retirement of legacy w
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## 🚧 High Priority Workstreams
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### [Security] Site Passcode JWT Migration
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- [ ] **[Security] Verify `/authenticate_passcode` deployment** — confirm explicit role priority,
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complete role flags, `auth_type: 'passcode'`, per-role TTLs, and minimum length validation.
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- [ ] **[Security] Replace local passcode comparison** — migrate
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`e_app_access_type.svelte` to server verification, JWT storage, and pending/error UI.
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- [ ] **[Security] Remove client-side passcode delivery/storage** — stop caching
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`access_code_kv_json`, remove `site_access_code_kv` from auth state, and remove passcode logging.
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- [ ] **[Security] Enforce passcode JWT expiry on restore** — expired passcode sessions must
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return to anonymous without affecting user-login JWT handling.
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Reference: `documentation/PROJECT__AE_Site_Passcode_Security.md`.
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### [Stores] Svelte 4 → Svelte 5 State Migration
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The app uses `svelte-persisted-store` (coarse reactivity). Migration target: replace with Svelte 5
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`PersistedState` (from `runed`) for fine-grained updates. See `PROJECT__Stores_Svelte5_Migration.md`.
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@@ -120,6 +143,15 @@ uses `build_tmp_sort` (overrides generic encoding in its `specific_processor`).
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### [Journals] Journal Entry Config follow-ups
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- [ ] **[Journals] Entry passcode secondary auth** — implement `passcode_hash` comparison.
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- [ ] **[Journals] Quick Add/import encryption behavior** — both creation paths currently
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create plaintext entries; define the intended privacy UX and add encryption support before
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claiming that these paths honor entry E2EE.
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- [ ] **[Journals] Remove decrypted-content console preview** —
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`ae_journals_decryption.ts` logs the first 30 plaintext characters after successful decryption.
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Never log private journal content.
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- [ ] **[Journals] Confirm outbound email-sharing requirement** — the archived UI project listed
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this as unfinished, but no implementation exists. Confirm product/security requirements before
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creating an email workflow for private journal content.
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---
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@@ -1,11 +1,17 @@
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# PROJECT: AE Events Badges — Review Form & Print Font Controls
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# Archived Project: AE Events Badges — Review Form & Print Font Controls
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**Created:** 2026-02-27
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**Last Updated:** 2026-03-18
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**Completed and Archived:** 2026-06-12
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**Last Verified Against Source:** 2026-06-12
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**Branch:** `ae_app_3x_llm`
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**Priority:** HIGH — first live event is Axonius, NYC, mid-April 2026
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**Owner:** Scott Idem / One Sky IT
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**Status:** ✅ TASK 1 COMPLETE | ✅ TASK 2 COMPLETE | ✅ TASK 3 COMPLETE | ✅ TASK 4.1 COMPLETE | ⏳ TASK 4.0 OPEN
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**Status:** Complete — review form, kiosk controls, auto-scaling, QR rendering, layouts, and print tracking are implemented.
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The original project scope is complete and this document is retained as implementation history.
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Current behavior is documented in `documentation/MODULE__AE_Events_Badges.md` and
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`documentation/MODULE__AE_Events_Badge_Templates.md`. Remaining email-delivery and permission-config
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unification work is tracked in `documentation/TODO__Agents.md`. Planning statements later in this
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||||
archived document describe the state at the time they were written and are not current instructions.
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||||
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||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -44,32 +50,24 @@ Both flows should respect the same permission model:
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- Permissions are configured per-event in `event.mod_badges_json.edit_permissions`.
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Hardcoded defaults are used until that config is implemented.
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**Current gap (TASK 4):** The print page edit button is currently gated to trusted_access only.
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It needs to be accessible to attendees at the kiosk (with appropriate field-level gating),
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||||
matching the permission model already implemented in `ae_comp__badge_review_form.svelte`.
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**Task 4 outcome:** The print controls now implement field-level editing. Authenticated users
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can edit template-approved fields, trusted staff can correct names, and trusted staff in global
|
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Edit Mode can edit all fields. First printing is available at public kiosk access; reprinting
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||||
requires trusted access plus Edit Mode. Remote review uses event-level `edit_permissions`, while
|
||||
the print controls currently use template-level `controls_cfg`; unification is tracked separately.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Next Up for Badges (TASK 4)
|
||||
## Task 4 Outcomes
|
||||
|
||||
### 0. Kiosk Editing — Print Page Permission Model Alignment
|
||||
**This is the most important gap before the first live event.**
|
||||
### 0. Kiosk Editing — Complete
|
||||
|
||||
Currently the print page edit button is staff-only (trusted_access gate). At the kiosk,
|
||||
attendees need to be able to edit their own fields (same attendee-level permissions as the
|
||||
review form), with staff-only fields gated appropriately.
|
||||
`ae_comp__badge_print_controls.svelte` provides the inline controls and live preview. Its default
|
||||
authenticated fields are title, affiliations, location, lead tracking, and pronouns; template
|
||||
`controls_cfg` can narrow the fields shown and editable. Email delivery remains a placeholder;
|
||||
when implemented it must send to `event_badge.email`, never `email_override`.
|
||||
|
||||
Work needed:
|
||||
- Wire the same `can_edit_fields` / `can_edit(field)` permission logic into the print page
|
||||
that `ae_comp__badge_review_form.svelte` already uses.
|
||||
- The edit panel on the print page should show attendee-editable fields to all authenticated
|
||||
users, and staff-only fields to trusted_access+.
|
||||
- The badge render (v1 or v2) should update live as the attendee edits fields.
|
||||
- Consider whether the print page needs its own inline edit panel (sidebar or overlay)
|
||||
or whether it should share/reuse the review form component alongside the badge render.
|
||||
- **Do NOT use `email_override` as the send-to address** — always use `event_badge.email`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Auto-Scaling Badge Text — In Progress
|
||||
### 1. Auto-Scaling Badge Text — Complete
|
||||
`ae_comp__badge_obj_view.svelte` using `element_fit_text.svelte` (binary search auto-scale).
|
||||
Toggle between v1 (heuristic) and v2 (auto-scale) on the print page via the `v1`/`v2` header button.
|
||||
Heights tuned per layout in `fit_heights` derived object. Still needs visual tuning with real badges.
|
||||
@@ -105,10 +103,11 @@ badge data, gated by `allow_tracking` on the badge.
|
||||
|
||||
## Implementation Status
|
||||
|
||||
### ⏳ TASK 4.0: Kiosk Editing — NOT STARTED (updated 2026-03-18)
|
||||
Print page edit access needs to be opened to attendee-level permissions, not just trusted_access.
|
||||
The permission model, field list, and `can_edit()` helper from `ae_comp__badge_review_form.svelte`
|
||||
should be the reference. See Design Intent section above.
|
||||
### ✅ TASK 4.0: Kiosk Editing — COMPLETE (verified 2026-06-12)
|
||||
The print controls implement authenticated field editing, trusted name correction, trusted + Edit
|
||||
Mode full editing, and live preview. The print path uses template `controls_cfg`; the review path
|
||||
uses event `mod_badges_json.edit_permissions`. Aligning those configuration sources is a follow-up,
|
||||
not a blocker to the completed kiosk controls.
|
||||
|
||||
**Note (2026-03-18):** `style_href` and `duplex` are both fully implemented and verified in code —
|
||||
the MODULE doc TODO list was stale. `duplex` is in `properties_to_save`; v2 badge render gates
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@
|
||||
# Aether Journals UI Update (2026)
|
||||
# Archived Project: Aether Journals UI Update (2026)
|
||||
|
||||
> **Status:** 🚧 Phase 4 Active (Security/Encryption Blockers remain; Journal Entry config rework in progress)
|
||||
> **Last Updated:** 2026-05-05
|
||||
> **Status:** Completed and archived 2026-06-12
|
||||
> **Last Verified Against Source:** 2026-06-12
|
||||
> **Primary Agent:** Frontend SvelteKit Agent
|
||||
|
||||
The UI modernization scope is complete: V3 CRUD, Quick Add, Append/Prepend,
|
||||
import/export, auto-save, configuration modals, decryption isolation, and the
|
||||
Journals style pass are implemented. Unfinished security and product follow-ups
|
||||
were transferred to `documentation/TODO__Agents.md`; current operational behavior
|
||||
and limitations live in `documentation/MODULE__AE_Journals.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Project Overview
|
||||
This document outlines the modernization of the Journals module UI in the SvelteKit frontend (`aether_app_sveltekit`). The primary goals are to fully leverage the generic V3 API architecture and introduce high-velocity productivity features for journal management.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +35,7 @@ This document outlines the modernization of the Journals module UI in the Svelte
|
||||
* **Definitions:** `app/ae_obj_types_def.py` -> `app/object_definitions/journals.py`
|
||||
* **Endpoints:** `/v3/crud/journal/...` and `/v3/crud/journal_entry/...`
|
||||
|
||||
### Frontend (In Progress)
|
||||
### Frontend (Completed UI modernization scope)
|
||||
* **State Management:** `src/lib/ae_journals/ae_journals_stores.ts`
|
||||
* **Local Storage:** Dexie.js (`db_journals`)
|
||||
* **API Client:** `src/lib/api/api.ts` -> `get_ae_obj`
|
||||
@@ -68,7 +74,7 @@ This document outlines the modernization of the Journals module UI in the Svelte
|
||||
- [x] Implement Bulk Export/Import system.
|
||||
- [x] Establish centralized Export Template engine.
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 4: Polish & Security (ACTIVE)
|
||||
### Phase 4: Polish & Security (UI scope complete; security follow-ups transferred)
|
||||
- [x] Implement Auto-Save toggle and visual status indicators.
|
||||
- [x] Extract decryption workflow to non-reactive helper.
|
||||
- [x] **Standardize Configuration Modals:** Refactored Module, Journal, and Entry configuration into a unified tabbed UI.
|
||||
@@ -81,9 +87,9 @@ This document outlines the modernization of the Journals module UI in the Svelte
|
||||
- [x] **Dark mode fixes:** Entry content hover, journal view section/description background and text colors.
|
||||
- [x] **Modal close button:** All 3 config modals use `dismissable={false}` + explicit `<X>` button in header snippet for correct right-aligned placement.
|
||||
- [x] **Global select padding:** Added `padding-inline: 0.5rem` to `@layer base` in `app.css` (safe — utility `px-*` classes override it where intentional).
|
||||
- [ ] Solidify E2EE passcode system for Journals and Entries.
|
||||
- [ ] Audit encryption flow for Quick Added and Imported entries.
|
||||
- [ ] Integrate Outbound Email sharing.
|
||||
- [ ] Solidify E2EE passcode system for Journals and Entries. See active task list.
|
||||
- [ ] Audit encryption flow for Quick Added and Imported entries. See active task list.
|
||||
- [ ] Integrate Outbound Email sharing. Deferred pending product confirmation.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user