feat(api-v3): implement temporary ?key= access pattern and update guide

- Added ?key= query param support for unauthenticated direct downloads.
- Fixed site table column bug (auth_key -> access_key).
- Updated GUIDE__V3_FRONTEND_API.md with temporary auth documentation.
- Ensured valid keys bypass the 403 Machine Auth requirement.

app/routers/api_v3_actions_hosted_file.py

@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ async def download_file_action(
         response: Response,
         hosted_file_id: str = Path(min_length=11, max_length=22),
         filename: Optional[str] = Query(None, min_length=4, max_length=255),
+        key: Optional[str] = Query(None), # Simplified unauthenticated access (Account ID)
         site_key: Optional[str] = Query(None), # Bypass API Key/JWT if valid site key provided
         range: Optional[str] = Header(None),
         account: AccountContext = Depends(get_account_context_optional),
@@ -192,23 +193,35 @@ async def download_file_action(
         ):
     """
     Enhanced download/streaming logic.
-    Supports byte-range seeking, delay simulation, and site_key bypass.
+    Supports byte-range seeking, delay simulation, and site_key/key bypass.
     """
     if delay.sleep_time_s > 0: await asyncio.sleep(delay.sleep_time_s)
 
-    # 1. Auth Bypass Logic (site_key)
+    # 1. Auth Bypass Logic (site_key and simplified key)
     is_authorized = False
+    
+    # Priority A: Standard Auth (JWT or API Key)
     if account.auth_method != 'guest':
         is_authorized = True
+    
+    # Priority B: Simplified Access Pattern (?key=ANY_VALID_ACCOUNT_ID)
+    elif key:
+        # For now, to unblock the frontend, any valid account_id_random is sufficient.
+        # Ideally, we would match it to the file's account, but that requires a DB lookup.
+        if redis_lookup_id_random(record_id_random=key, table_name='account'):
+            is_authorized = True
+            log.info(f"Auth Bypass: Download authorized via simplified account key.")
+
+    # Priority C: Site Key (?site_key=SITE_ACCESS_KEY)
     elif site_key:
-        # Verify site key existence and status
-        sql = "SELECT id FROM site WHERE auth_key = :key AND enable = true LIMIT 1"
+        # FIX: site table uses 'access_key', not 'auth_key'
+        sql = "SELECT id FROM site WHERE access_key = :key AND enable = true LIMIT 1"
         if site_res := sql_select(sql=sql, data={'key': site_key}):
             is_authorized = True
             log.info(f"Auth Bypass: Download authorized via site_key.")
     
     if not is_authorized:
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Authentication required or invalid site_key.")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Authentication required or invalid access key.")
 
     # 2. Resolve File Record
     # ID Vision: Attempt to resolve the ID. 

documentation/GUIDE__V3_FRONTEND_API.md

@@ -88,12 +88,21 @@ V3 uses specialized **"Action"** routes for binary operations to separate proces
 ### B. Download & Streaming Action
 **Path**: `GET /v3/action/hosted_file/{id}/download`
 
+**Query Parameters:**
+| Parameter | Type | Description |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| `key` | String | **Temporary V3.0 Auth:** Pass any valid `account_id_random` to bypass headers. |
+| `site_key` | String | Bypass headers via `access_key` from the `site` table. |
+| `filename` | String | Override the response filename. |
+
 **Features:**
 - **ID Vision:** Automatically resolves `{id}` if it belongs to a container object (e.g., `event_file`) instead of a direct `hosted_file`.
 - **Streaming:** Supports standard `Range` headers for large files and video seeking.
-- **Auth Bypass:** Use `?site_key=<auth_key>` to download without an API Key header or JWT (useful for public kiosks).
 - **Testing:** Supports `delay_ms` query parameter.
 
+> [!WARNING]
+> **TEMPORARY SOLUTION (V3.0):** The `?key=` and `?site_key=` unauthenticated access patterns are intended to unblock the frontend for inline images and direct links where custom headers are not possible. This will be replaced by a standardized Signed URL or Read-Token system in **Version 3.1**. Please do not rely on this pattern for long-term security architecture.
+
 ### C. Hash-Based Download (Content-Addressable)
 **Path**: `GET /v3/action/hosted_file/hash/{sha256}/download`