SvelteKit load functions fire during link prefetch before Novi auth completes; `if (browser)` guards do not prevent this. Moving all IDAA data fetching into $effect hooks gated on `novi_verified || trusted_access` closes the IDB pre-population race across archives, bb/[post_id], and recovery_meetings/[event_id]. Also documents the Auth-Before-Cache rule and per-route status in AE__Permissions_and_Security.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
208 lines
9.1 KiB
Markdown
208 lines
9.1 KiB
Markdown
# Aether — Permissions and Security
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**Last updated:** 2026-02-27
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**Source of truth:** `src/lib/ae_utils/ae_utils__perm_checks.ts`, `src/lib/stores/ae_stores.ts`
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---
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## Access Level Hierarchy
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Highest to lowest. Each level **inherits all access from every level below it**.
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| Level | `access_type` string | Typical Use |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| Super | `super` | OSIT internal — full system access |
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| Manager | `manager` | Account managers |
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| Administrator | `administrator` | Event/account admins |
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| Trusted | `trusted` | **Onsite staff** — site passcode or AE login |
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| Public | `public` | Site-wide passcode granted |
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| Authenticated | `authenticated` | Identity verified (e.g. IDAA Novi UUID) |
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| Anonymous | `anonymous` | Default — not signed in |
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> **Note on Public vs Authenticated:** `public` is a *site-wide* unlock (anyone with the passcode). `authenticated` verifies a *specific identity*. In the hierarchy, public outranks authenticated because it implies broader site access.
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---
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## `$ae_loc` Store — Permission Flags
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`$ae_loc` is a `persisted()` store (backed by localStorage). Key fields:
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```typescript
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$ae_loc.access_type // string: current access type ('anonymous', 'trusted', etc.)
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// Cumulative boolean flags (true = "you have AT LEAST this level")
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$ae_loc.anonymous_access // always true
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$ae_loc.authenticated_access // true from authenticated and above
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$ae_loc.public_access // true from public and above
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$ae_loc.trusted_access // true from trusted and above ← most-used gate
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$ae_loc.administrator_access // true from administrator and above
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$ae_loc.manager_access // true from manager and above
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$ae_loc.super_access // true only at super
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// Exclusive check flags (true = "you are EXACTLY this level")
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$ae_loc.trusted_check // true only if access_type === 'trusted'
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$ae_loc.administrator_check // etc.
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// (rarely needed — prefer the _access flags)
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// Behavior flags
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$ae_loc.edit_mode // boolean — user preference, see below
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$ae_loc.adv_mode // boolean — advanced mode toggle
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```
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### Additional intermediate levels (in permission checks, not in hierarchy order)
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`support`, `assistant`, `verified`, `provisional` — appear in `_access` flags but are not part of the canonical `access_level_order`. Treat as internal/intermediate.
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---
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## Edit Mode — Critical Rules
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`$ae_loc.edit_mode` is a **user preference**, not a permission level.
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**Rules that must never be broken:**
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1. **Components must never write to `$ae_loc.edit_mode`** — only the system menu toggle and sign-out/permission-drop handlers may change it.
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2. Edit mode is only available to `trusted` and above in 95% of modules (the toggle is hidden from lower-access users).
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3. Edit mode persists across navigation — it is NOT reset by page loads or component mounts.
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4. Sign-out and permission drops to below `authenticated` should reset `edit_mode` to `false`.
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> **Background:** A bug was fixed (2026-02-27) where `ae_comp__badge_obj_view.svelte` was writing `$ae_loc.edit_mode = false` in a data-loading `$effect`, silently overriding the user's preference on every navigation to the badge print page.
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---
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## Authentication Methods
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| Method | Grants | Used For |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| Site passcode (`site_access_code_kv`) | `trusted`, `public`, or `authenticated` | Onsite staff and event attendees |
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| AE Username + Password | `trusted` and above | Staff with AE accounts |
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| Novi UUID | `authenticated` | IDAA members (Novi membership system) |
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Passcodes are stored per-level in `$ae_loc.site_access_code_kv`:
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```typescript
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site_access_code_kv: {
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administrator: null, // highest passcode tier
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trusted: null, // onsite staff passcode
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public: 'public1980', // example
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authenticated: 'auth1980'
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}
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```
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---
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## Utility Functions
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### `process_permission_checks(access_type: string)`
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Returns a full permission object (`_check` and `_access` flags) for a given access type string. Used when access type changes to update `$ae_loc`.
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```typescript
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import { process_permission_checks } from '$lib/ae_utils/ae_utils__perm_checks';
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const checks = process_permission_checks('trusted');
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// checks.trusted_access === true
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// checks.administrator_access === false
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```
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### `compare_access_levels(level_a, level_b)`
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Returns `1` if `level_a` is higher, `-1` if lower, `0` if equal. Useful for threshold comparisons.
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---
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## Privacy and Security Rules
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### IDAA — International Doctors in Alcoholics Anonymous
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- **ALL IDAA content is private. Always. No exceptions.**
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- BB (Bulletin Board / Posts), Archives, Recovery Meetings — all require authentication.
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- IDAA users authenticate via Novi UUID at `authenticated` level or higher.
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- A prior agent accidentally exposed IDAA BB data publicly — treat any IDAA exposure as Sev-1.
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#### IDAA IndexedDB (IDB) Caching — Auth-Before-Cache Rule
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**Root cause discovered 2026-04:** SvelteKit `+page.ts`/`+layout.ts` load functions run *before* layout `$effect` hooks and fire during link prefetch (hover). `if (browser)` guards do NOT prevent this — they only prevent SSR. This means API calls inside these files execute before Novi auth completes, writing private IDAA data to the user's IndexedDB even for unauthenticated sessions.
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**The fix — established pattern for all IDAA routes:**
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1. **Load/layout `.ts` files = thin shells.** Pass URL params only. No API calls. No `if (browser)` data fetching.
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2. **Data loading = `$effect` in `.svelte` files**, gated on:
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```svelte
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if (!$idaa_loc.novi_verified && !$ae_loc.trusted_access) return;
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```
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3. **Three IDB purge paths** in `(idaa)/+layout.svelte` (auth failure, anonymous no-UUID, Reset & Retry button) clear `db_posts`, `db_archives`, and `db_events` tables.
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**Auth path matrix:**
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| User type | `novi_verified` | `trusted_access` | Can load data? | Purge fires? |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| Anonymous / unauthenticated | false | false | No | Yes (Case 1) |
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| Novi-verified IDAA member | true | false | Yes | No |
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| Manager / trusted access | false | true | Yes | No (Case 3 exemption) |
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**Applied to routes (as of 2026-04-19):**
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- `idaa/bb/+page.svelte` — `$effect` gate added; `bb/+page.ts` stripped
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- `idaa/bb/[post_id]/+page.ts` — stripped; loading handled by trigger in `bb/+layout.svelte`
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- `idaa/archives/+page.svelte` — `$effect` gate added; `archives/+layout.ts` stripped
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- `idaa/archives/[archive_id]/+page.svelte` — `$effect` gate added; `[archive_id]/+page.ts` stripped
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- `idaa/recovery_meetings/+page.svelte` — `$effect` gate already present; `+layout.ts` stripped
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- `idaa/recovery_meetings/[event_id]/+page.svelte` — `$effect` gate added; `+page.ts` stripped
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**When adding a new IDAA route:** never put API calls in `+page.ts`/`+layout.ts`. Always gate data fetching with the `$effect` pattern above.
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### Journals
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- Private personal data. Always authenticated. Passcode/encryption features exist.
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- Never expose journal content publicly.
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### `PUBLIC_AE_API_SECRET_KEY`
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- Audit closed 2026-03-11. `PUBLIC_*` prefix is by design — key is always in the client bundle.
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- Anonymous site-domain lookup uses the limited-permission `PUBLIC_AE_BOOTSTRAP_KEY` instead.
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- Security model: API key is one layer; JWT + `x-account-id` scoping provides the primary auth.
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- Do not introduce new usages. Prefer `PUBLIC_AE_BOOTSTRAP_KEY` for unauthenticated lookups.
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### Email Display
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Non-trusted users must never see a full email address. Obscure using:
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```typescript
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// joh***@example.com
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function obscure_email(email: string): string {
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const at = email.indexOf('@');
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if (at < 0) return email;
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return `${email.slice(0, Math.min(3, at))}***${email.slice(at)}`;
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}
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```
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This pattern lives in `ae_comp__badge_obj_li.svelte` — move to `ae_utils` if needed elsewhere.
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---
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## Module-Specific Permission Patterns
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### Events — Badges
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| Scenario | Visibility | Print Action | Review Actions |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| Anonymous / below trusted | Unprinted only | None (name display only) | Email Review Link button (→ email API) |
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| Trusted, not Edit Mode | Unprinted only | Clickable (first print) | Email Review Link button |
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| Trusted, Edit Mode | All non-hidden | Clickable incl. reprint; shows `Nx` count | Email Review Link + direct Review Link (clipboard) |
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- Print count badge: shown as `Nx` (e.g. `2×`) next to the printer icon when `print_count >= 1`
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- Edit mode for badges: limited to `trusted_access` users (toggle hidden from lower levels)
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- `person_passcode` field (for attendee-gated review URL): **not yet in DB** as of 2026-02-27
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### IDAA
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- Auth gate test must be the **first test** in any test file — privacy enforcement is a hard requirement.
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- Default required permission: `trusted_access` or higher for module access.
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---
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## Common Template Patterns
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```svelte
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<!-- Gate on trusted access -->
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{#if $ae_loc.trusted_access}
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<!-- Gate on edit mode (always check trusted too — edit mode alone is insufficient) -->
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{#if $ae_loc.trusted_access && $ae_loc.edit_mode}
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<!-- Gate on administrator -->
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{#if $ae_loc.administrator_access}
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<!-- Show full vs obscured email -->
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{$ae_loc.trusted_access ? email : obscure_email(email)}
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```
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> Never gate purely on `$ae_loc.edit_mode` without also checking a permission level. Edit mode is a UI preference, not a permission grant.
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