feat: session auth + per-user/persona UI at /{user}/{persona}
Replaces nginx basic auth with a proper per-user session system:
- auth_utils.py: bcrypt password hashing, JWT cookie creation/decode
- auth_middleware.py: validates JWT cookie on all routes except /login,
/health, /static/, and webhook endpoints (/channels/, /webhook/)
- routers/ui.py: GET /login, POST /login, POST /logout,
GET /{username}/{persona} — serves index.html with CORTEX_CONFIG injected
- static/login.html: minimal login form (dark theme, matches UI)
- main.py: registers SessionAuthMiddleware + ui.router
- config.py: jwt_secret, jwt_expire_days settings
- manage_passwords.py: CLI tool to set/check/list user passwords
- app.js: reads window.CORTEX_CONFIG (user + persona), sends both on
every /chat and /orchestrate request; persona name shown in header;
logout button (⏏) added to header
- requirements.txt: bcrypt, PyJWT, python-multipart
- .env.default: JWT_SECRET, JWT_EXPIRE_DAYS documented
- tests: client fixture injects JWT cookie; security test assertions
updated for URL-normalized path traversal paths (still secure, codes differ)
All 80 tests pass.
Setup for a new user:
python manage_passwords.py set scott
python manage_passwords.py set holly
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -14,7 +14,14 @@ import pytest
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_files_no_path_traversal_in_filename(client):
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"""File endpoint must not serve files outside the ALLOWED set."""
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"""
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File endpoint must not serve files outside the ALLOWED set.
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Note: paths containing '..' are URL-normalized before reaching FastAPI.
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'/files/../../etc/passwd' becomes '/etc/passwd' at the ASGI layer — it
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never hits the files router. We verify no file content is returned (any
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non-200 code is safe); 302 redirects to login are fine.
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"""
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dangerous = [
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"../config.py",
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"../../etc/passwd",
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@@ -25,8 +32,8 @@ async def test_files_no_path_traversal_in_filename(client):
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]
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for name in dangerous:
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r = await client.get(f"/files/{name}")
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assert r.status_code in (404, 422), \
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f"Expected 404/422 for {name!r}, got {r.status_code}"
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assert r.status_code != 200 or "content" not in r.json(), \
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f"Got 200 with file content for {name!r} — path traversal may be possible"
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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